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TRENDS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT*
WALTER L. BROWN"*
T HE Taft-Hartley Act undertook to modify and givei new direction to the national labor policy reflected in the
Wagner Act and the rulings and decisions resulting from thirteen
years of its administration. In an address before the Texas Bar
Association on July 1, 1948, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board stated:
"The Act was enacted to create a mutuality or respon-
sibility and standing and to bring employers and the repre-
sentatives of their employees to a parity of obligations and
privileges; to eliminate the unilateral advantages that ex-
isted in the past; and to give to everyone in the labor-man-
agement relations field an even break."'
That everyone in the labor-management field did not receive
"an even break" in the past resulted from a law with unbalanced
provisions and a National Labor Relations Board which gave it
an unbalanced administration. The Taft-Hartley Act made ex-
tensive additions to the substantive provisions of the Wagner Act.
In the main they were designed to give balance to our national
labor policy by imposing responsibilities on labor organizations
and by protecting the legitimate rights of employers and the in-
dividual employee who may choose not to belong to a labor organ-
ization. Also the Taft-Hartley Act introduced administrative
and procedural changes, the most significant of which was the
creation of the office of General Counsel of the Boald. Appointed
by the President, the General Counsel has final authority with
respect to investigating charges and issuing and prosecuting com-
plaints. Consequently, the functions of investigator, prosecutor
and judge have been separated. In addition, there were other
changes in past Board procedure designed to emphasize the
Board's semi-judicial character. In a real sense the act created a
"new" National Labor Relations Board.
* Except for a few changes in the text and the addition of footnotes, this
paper was prepared for and read before the annual meeting of the West Virginia
Bar Association at White Sulphur Springs on August 19, 1948. The writer
acknowledges the aid of Robert A. Levitt, a member of the New York bar, in it;
preparation.
** General Counsel, Western Electric Company, New York, N. Y.
1 See NLRB Rel. R-102.
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The Taft-Hartley Act was passed over a Presidential veto on
June 23, 1947, and the purpose of this paper is to take a brief look
at the first year of its administration. It is not surprising that a
law so controversial and with such a stormy legislative history has
already brought forth official rulings and decisions numbering
in the hundreds. Most of the available opinions construing and
applying the new Act are opinions of the Board and its trial ex-
aminers but there have been a few significant court decisions and
a number of opinions of the General Counsel on matters of im-
portance.2 Of course the latter are not binding on the Board but
they are a relevant part of the administrative picture. Moreover,
as was to be expected, there has been extensive comment in legal
periodicals. 3 As a result there now exists a considerable literature
to aid one who hz ,casion to deal with the new act.
It is quite evidently beyond the scope of this paper to attempt
a comprehensive review of the work of the Board, the courts and
the General Counsel during the first year of the act. Nevertheless,
an examination of the treatment of a few problems of general in-
2 This represents a departure from the practice pursued under the Wagner
Act when the General Counsel assidnoudy avoided rendering opinions. These
opinions have been informal in nature and are not compiled but anpear in
releases issued by the Board from time to time which are publi'hed in private
labor law reporting services such as the I.abor Relations Refe-ence Manual
(Bureau of National Affairs) and Commerce Cleariniz House Labor Law Re-
ports. For example, see the public addresses by the General Counsel, Associate
General Counsel and Assistant General Counsel which are reported in NLRB
releases R-51, R-64, R-67, R-79, R-80, R-83, R-87, R-102, R-107, R-108.
3 See, for example, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE NEW LABOR LAW
(1947); VAN ARKt.E, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ar,
1937 (1947) (General Practice Series of the American Bar Association and the
Practicing Law Institute); Barnett, The Constitutionality of the Expurgatorv
Oath Requircment of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 27 ORE. L.
REv. 85 (1948); Cox, Some Aspecft of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947), id. 247 (1948); Green, Evidence of Unfair Labor
Practices under the Taft-Hartley .4ct, 26 N. C. L. REv. 253 (1948); Iserman,
The Labor Management Act: New Law as to Evidence and the Scope of Review,
33 A. B. A. J. 760 (1947); Livengood, Labor Contracts and the Taft-Hartley Act,
26 N. C. L. REv. 1 (1947); Reilly. The Taft-Hartley Act-Another Viewpoint,
20 TENN. L. REv. 181 (1948); Sickles, Discretion of NLRJ, Modified in the
Determination of an Appropriate Bargaining Unit, 36 GEo. L. J. 602 (1948);
Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 46
MicH. L. REv. 593 (1948); Witte, Labor-Managetzent Relations under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 25 HARV. Bus. REv. 554 (1947); Wohlmuth, The Taft-Hartley Act
and Collective Bargaining, 9 Mo. L. Rrv. 1 (1948): Notes, Union Escape Clauses
and the Taft-Hartley Act, 48 COL. L. RV. 105 (1948); The Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 42 ILL. L. R.v. 444 (1947), Union Control over the
Workets' Employment as Affected by the Taft-Hartley Act, 33 IowA L. REv.
539 (1948).
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terest should indicate the direction which the administration of
the act is taking.
FREE SPEECH AND COERCION
Under Section 8 (ti) (1) of the Wagner Act it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7." The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and in
principle the old Board recognized the right of an employer to
express an opinion regarding unions and the union activity of
employees as long as coercion was avoided. Nevertheless, under
the administration of the old Board the expression of an opinion
by an employer was a very hazardous undertaking, There was a
strong tendency to construe any forcefully expressed opinion as
coercive; and if coercion could not be found in the language, the
statement was often treated as evidence of a "course of conduct"
which was coercive. Consequently, the Taft-Hartley Act added
Section 8 (c), the so-called free speech amendment, which provides
that, "The expressing of any views, argument or opinion ....
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
.... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit."
It is too early to say just hpw extensive a change will result
from this provision; but it is clear that the new Board is prepared
to go much farther than the old Board in upholding expressions
of management. Its chairman has said that there is no doubt
that the law has been modified;4 and in applying the new section
to some old cases the Board has reversed trial examiners' reports5
and in recent cases has avoided reliance upon the "course of con-
duct" theory.8 Most significant is the changed attitude towards
vigorous action of an employer in connection with a representa-
tion election. Completely gone is the old Board's doctrine re-
quiring employer neutrality. In a recent case the Board reversed
a trial examiner's finding that an employer violated the act by
sending employees sample ballots marked against the union and
strongly worded anti-union notices and announcements in which
4 Daily Labor Report 54, p. D4 (1948).
0 E.g., Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 75 N. L. R. B. Ill (1947).
a Bailey Co., 75 N. L. R. B. 113 (1947); Tygart Sportswear Co., 77 N. L. R.
B. 9B (1948).
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the company was treated as the opponent of the union in a forth-
coming NLRB election7 Also, the General Shoe case, which I
shall discuss presently, recognizes the right of an employee to enter
a campaign and strongly oppose unionization. Another decision
clearly abandons the "captive audience" doctrine of the Clerk
Brothers case s and holds that it is no longer an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to compel employees to listen to an anti-
union address on company time and property.9 In step with this
general administrative trend the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has held that an employer did not violate the act
when he sought to poll employees by mail on the question whether
they were willing to accept the last offer made to the union be-
fore negotiations broke down.'0
On the other hand, the new Board has held that the "free
speech amendment" will not protect interrogation of employees
about their union affiliation and related matters because such
questioning is not the expression of "views, argument, or opin-
ion";" nor will it protect a letter to employees advising them prior
to an election that they will "find it difficult, if not impossible"
to get a job with any other employer in the industry if they vote
for the union.12 These decisions are reminders that, as the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently stated, "em-
ployers still may not, under the guise of merely exercising their
right of free speech, pursue a course of conduct designed to coerce
their employees." 13
The problem of distinguishing between what is a proper ex-
ercise of the privilege of free speech and what is coercive is not
always an easy one. Nice distinctions are sometimes called for.
For example, the new Board has held that a statement made by a
foreman that the day the union "came in was the day he was
leaving" was protected free speech.14 On the other hand, in the
subsequent West Ohio Gas case,' 5 a majority held that a statement
by a foreman that "there will never be a union around" anywhere
7 Wrought Tron Range Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 85 (1948).
a 70 N. L. R. B. 803 (1946).
8 Babcock and Wilcox, NLRB Release R-84.
10 NLRB v. Penokee Veneer Co., 168 F.2d 868 (C. C. A. 7th 1948).
31 Ames Spot Welder Co., Inc., 75 N. L. R. B. 45 (1947).
12 Lafayette National Bank, 77 N. L. R. B. 195 (1948).
23 NLRB v. Gate City Cotton Mills, 167 F.2d 647 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
14 Atlantic Metallic Casket Co., 75 N. L. R. B. 28 (1947).
15 76 N. L. R. B. 27 (1948).
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he works was coercive. Both decisions seem sound. In the first
case the foreman expressed an antipathy to unions strong enough
to induce him to quit if the union came in; but there was no threat
either express or implied. In the second statement, however, the
threatening overtones are quite definite. 1
The same majority has made a legal distinction of question-
able validity in the case of the General Shoe Corporation." There
the company had taken a very active part in an election campaign,
circulating letters and leaflets to its employees, and publishing
newspaper advertisements, forcefully opposing the union. On
the day before the election the president of the company had the
foremen take employees away from their woik in groups of twenty
to twenty-five and bring them to his office, which the Board re-
ferred to as the "locus of authority in the plant," where he read
to each a strong six page speech opposing the union. It was held
that none of the statements of the employer went beyond priv-
ileged free speech and none was coercive. Nevertheless, with two
members dissenting, the Board set aside the election saying, with
reference to the conduct of the president in calling the employees
to his office,
"In our opinion, this conduct,18 and the employer's in-
structions to its foremen to propagandize employees in their
homes, went so far beyond the presently accepted custom of
campaigns directed at employees' reasoning faculties that we
are not justified in assuming that the election results repre-
sented the employees' own wishes. .
The significance of the case lies in the fact that the majority holds
that conduct which cannot be considered as evidence of an unfair
labor practice, because of Section 8 (c), may nevertheless constitute
grounds for setting aside an election if an atmosphere is created
making a free choice of employees improbable. The minority
took the position that if the method by which the company ex-
pressed its views was such as to preclude "the free expression of
choice by employees in an election, it would be only logical to
conclude that the employment of such 'method' by an employer
16 Probably the Board would not consider a single statement of this
character sufficient grounds for Board action in itself. cf. Goldblatt Bros., Inc.,
77 N. L. R. B. 204 (1948). There were other features to the West Ohio Gas
case.
17 General Shoe Corp., 77 N. L. R. B. 18 (1948).
18 Emphasis supplied.
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to express its views is sufficiently coercive to be violative of the
act." However, the minority did not consider that there had been
any coercion.
In a case decided on July 22, 1948,10 the Board distinguishes
General Shoe and indicates that it will be given a restricted appli-
cation. It is of interest that the Board there refers to the case as
one in which the employer's conduct "so far abused normal cam-
paign tactics that the employees were inhibited in their free choice
of a bargaining representative"; which seems to say that what the
employer did was coercive. If the Board had put its decision in
General Shoe on the ground that what the president said had the
force of a command, under the particular circumstances in which
he said it, and consequently there was an implicit threat of re-
prisal if his views were not complied with, one would have less
difficulty with the decision. What the Board did was to solve a
hard case by making what I deem to be bad law. To say that an
employer's conduct which is not violative of the Act may be the
basis for setting aside an election seems unsound. 0
Both General Shoe and West Ohio Gas were difficult cases,
about which opinions may well differ. I think it is a healthy sign
that they were both three to two decisions. Also I think that the
available opinions under the free speech amendment, considered
as a whole, indicate that the Board is striving to give it a balanced
construction and application.
DisciiARGE FOR CAt:SE
It will be remembered that Section 10 (c) of the Act says that
the Board may not require an employer to reinstate an employee
"suspended or discharged for cause." Critics widely asserted that
this provision would enable employers with impunity to discharge
employees active in union matters on the slightest pretext. Like
other prophecies of doom that followed on the heels of the passage
19 Hinde and Dauch Paper Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1229 (1948).
2b See the Board's most recent decision on the subject in Gray Drug
Stores, Inc., Daily Labor Report 193, p. A-1. While the full text of the opinion
in that case was unavailable at the time this article was completed, a summary
report of the decision indicates that the Board may have circumscribed its
General Shoe ruling to a point just short of extinction. In that case the Board
declined to set aside an election despite the fact that in the two days prior to
a representation election, the vice-president, general manager and personnel
director of a drug store chain system toured each of the stores in the chain
and delivered anti-union addresses to employees individually and in small
groups on company time and property.
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of the Taft-Hartley Act, this one proved unwarranted. Shortly
after the act became effective, Counsel Denham announced that
his office would attempt to ascertain the true reason for action in
each case and would reject a "good cause" as the true reason for
discharge "if it has all the earmarks of nothing but subterfuge."' '
The construction of the act implicit in this statement is reasonable,
but it must always be borne in mind that the provision in question
was brought about by the old Board's practice of inferring im-
proper motives despite the existence of legitimate cause for dis-
charge.22 Presumably Congress did not intend to legalize discrim-
ination against an employee for union activity merely because
grounds exist which justify disciplinary action when considered
abstractly. Therefore, where it clearly appears that union activity
was the true reason for discharge, the provision should not apply.
On the other hand, if the new Board unduly extends itself to find
that the cause advanced by the employer is a subterfuge rather
than the true reason, the purpose of the piovision will be defeated.
The provision offers another good example of the need of a
balanced administration and, thus far, the decisions of the new
Board indicate that it will be so administered. In many cases the
causes for discharge assigned by the employer have been accepted
despite the availability of facts that might have been used to sup-
port contrary inferences. 2.1 On the other hand, where it appears
that the "cause" is a pretext, as where it was contrary to past prac-
tice to discipline for that reason,24 or where an employee dis.
charged for alleged inefficiency had not been warned,3 and the
timing of the discipline coincides with union activity, the Board
has ordered reinstatement. Moreover, a decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit2 6 and two Board deci-
sions27 have held that "for cause" refers not alone to the business
reason for discharging, but also to the basis of selection of em-
21 Address to ihe St. Louis Bar Association, 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Labor.
Management) 11 (1947).
2 See the Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, BNA,
The New Labor Law, p. D-5.
23 E.g., Vogue-Wright Studios, Inc., 76 N. L. R. B. 111 (1948); Pioneer
Electric Co., 75 N. L. R. B. 14 (1947); Colonial Life Insurance Co., 76 N. L. R. B.
102 (1948); Times-Picayune Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 75 (1948).
24 Atlantic Stages, 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1242 (1948).
25 West Ohio Gas Co., 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1156 (1948).
28 NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works, 145 F.2d 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
27 Sifers Candy Co., 75 N. L. R. B. 39 (1947); Differential Steel Car Co.,
75 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 86 (1947).
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ployees discharged. Consequently, although an employer may
havie a legitimatc reason for disciplinary action, he may be in
trouble if lie discharges those active in union affairs but overlooks
the offense in the case of others.
ILLEGAL COLLECTVE AcTION
There are sone significant decisions of the new Board re-
garding the right of an employer to discharge, or to refuse to re-
instate, an employee oecause of participation in illegal collective
action.
In the International Nickel case,23 the Board broke away
from its precedents to recognize the right of an employer to dis-
charge leaders of a strike who barred a plant entrance to super-
visors by an "implied threat of violence." Despite the absence
of any overt acts of violence, the Board held that the action of the
employees was not protected free speech, because of the implied
threats of force. The Board was careful to place its decision on
the fact that they had personally participated in the picket line
activity and thereby avoided deciding whether the strike leaders
could have been discharged merely because they directed how the
picketing was conducted. The decision has been construed as
initiating a considerable extension of the Fansteel doctrine. 2  It
will be recalled that in the historic Fansteel case the Supreme
Court held that employees taking part in a sit-down strike for-
feited their right to reinstatement. The old Board construed and
applied the decision very narrowly, restricting it to the sit-down
situation, ordering reinstatement to employees discharged for
other strike violence. This construction of the decision remained
substantially unchallenged until the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in a decision rendered after the Taft-Hartley
Act became effective, ruled that the protection afforded peaceful
picketing did not extend to barring an employer from his prop-
erty by implied threats of violence.sO International Nickel follows
the lead of the Seventh Circuit. In the Dearborn Glass case, which
came later, the Board refused to reinstate a strike leader who had
been discharged for mass picketing.3' More recently the Board
28 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1006 (1948).
20 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939).
s0 NLRB v. Perfect Cnicle Co.. 162 F. 2d. 566 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
a' Daily Labor Report, No. 157, p. A-L.
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expanded upon its decision in International Nickel by holding
that an employer did not violate the law when he discharged some
employees and laid off others who had participated in a mass
demonstration and blocked entrance into the plant by an implied
threat of bodily harm to employees of an independent contractor
retained by the employer.3 2
In another decision of importance, the Board looked to the
purpose of a strike and ruled that employees who strike to protest
the demotion of their foreman, and not to protect their own in-
terests, need not be reinstated.3 3 This decision was later restricted
somewhat when the Board held that it was a protected concerted
activity when only one of the two purposes of the activity was in
the employees' own interests. 3 4  In that case the employees met
for the dual purpose of discussing rehiring of a discharged fore-
man and the matter of a restroom for employees.
Several forthcoming decisions by the Board on the matters
of strikes and picketing will be of considerable interest. Early
opinions by trial examiners reveal conflict with the views of the
General Counsel and among trial examiners themselves. The
General Counsel has contended that a strike during the term of a
labor contract may of itself constitute restraint and coercion of
employees in the exercise of their rights under the act. In the
first case involving this important question,35 a well written opin-
ion of the trial examiner disagrees with the General Counsel and
subsequently the same position has been taken by another trial
examiner.3 6 Both of these cases involved organizational strikes
but the contention of the General Counsel seems to be broad
enough to include any strike for the purpose of interfering with a
valid contract between an employer and the representative of his
employees. Both trial examiners concluded, however, that the only
32 Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 78 N. L. R. B. 169 (1948).
s Fontaine Converting Works Inc., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1149
(NLRB 1948). See also LRR Analysis p. 37 (1948). The Board exerted itself
considerably to distinguish a recent decision holding that a life insurance
company violated the act when it discharged a salesman for protesting ap-
pointment of a cashier, NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Lite Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (C.
C. A. 7th 1948), and its own decision in Container Mfg. Co., 21 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(Ref. Man.) 1105 (1948), involving employees who had struck because of a
forelady's discharge.
34 Barton Brass Works, 22 Lab. Re. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1225 (NLRB 1948).
85 Perry-Norvell Co., 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. 53.
s6 Watson's Specialty Store, 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. 99.
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union restraint or coercion outlawed in Section 8 (b)l is the use
of force, the threat of force, mass picketing and the like; and that
a strike does not involve coercion, whether or not it is justifiable,
as long as it is peaceful and those who desire to work are not pre-
vented from doing so. In the Perry-Norvell opinion, the trial ex-
aminer cites some persuasive legislative history to support his
views.
On August 17, 1948, the Board decided the National Maritime
Union case3 7 in which it disagreed with the General Counsel as
to the meaning of "restrain or coerce" in Section 8 (b)l of the act,
with one dissent. The legislative history of the act, the Board
noted, strongly suggests that by the provision in question "Con-
gress was interested in eliminating physical violence and intimida-
tion by unions or their representatives as well as the use by unions
of threats of economic action against specific individuals in an
effort to compel them to join." The Board added,
"..... we are not prepared to say, as the General Counsel
and the Trial Examiner did, that a strike for an illegal ob-
jective necessarily 'restrains' and 'coerces' employees, as those
terms were intended to be applied in Sec. 8 (b) (1) (A). The
touchstone of a strike which is violative of Sec. 8 (b) (1) (A) is
normally the means by which it is accomplished so long as its
objective is directly related to the interests of the strikers, and
not directed primarily at compelling other employees to fore-
go the rights which Sec. 7 protects."38
A related problem is the extent to which the "free speech
amendment" protects peaceful picketing connected with strikes
and boycotts outlawed by the act. Several trial examiners have
held that peaceful picketing which is an integral part of an un-
lawful secondary boycott is not protected.*' One trial examiner
recently said ".... the picketing here under consideration is es-
sentially not speech but rather a verbal facet of an illegal strike."40
However, at least one trial examiner has decided to the contrary.41
In a precedent-making decision rendered recently, the new
Board found a union guilty of an unfair labor practice for the
37 78 N. L. R. B. 137 (1948).
38 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1300 (1948).
so Montgomery Fair Co., NLRB Release R-71. See also Wardsworth Bldg.
Co., Inc., NLRB Release R-72.
40 Gould and l'reisner, NLRB Release R-106.
41 Scalright Pacific Ltd., NLRB Release R-78.
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first time in history. The charge was engaging in a secondary
boycott in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the new act and the
decision contains several highly significant rulings. Saying that it
did so "in order to effectuate the policies of the Act," the Board
denied the motions of the complainant employers to withdraw
their charges. Also the Board held that the employer involved
in the primary dispute with the union can file secondary boycott
charges, because the act permits any person to file a charge; and
that a union cannot escape liability for engaging in a secondary
boycott because of an alleged alliance between the primary em-
ployer and the other employer "which rests solely on the fact that
the so-called ally is an independent sales outlet for the products
of the primary employer" and "there is no financial or other con-
nection other than that of seller and buyer" between the two
firms.42
COLLECTIVE BARtGAINING OBLIGATIONS OF EMPLOYERS
The first year of the new act witnessed something of a trend
away from the former tendency to stamp all unilateral action of
employers on collective bargaining matters as unfair labor prac-
tices. The Board has sustained the action of an employer who
granted a unilateral wage increase after two years of bargaining
in good faith had failed to result in any agreement and where other
firms in the area had made similar increases and the union had
approved increases subsequently made by the company.43 In an-
other case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sus-
tained a unilateral wage increase given after an impasse had been
reached in collective bargaining where the union had called a
strike vote and the raise was given to meet competitors' wages in
the area."4 However, it is still an unfair labor practice to give a
wage increase without consulting the union even though bargain-
ing has ceased and a strike has resulted from failure to agree on
union security provisionsY4
Other decisions dearly reflect a disposition to extend greater
freedom to management in regard to its bargaining obligations.
Thus, for example, the Board declined to find that the company
42 Schenley Distillers' Corp. and Jardine Liquor Corp., Daily Labor Report
143, p. D-1.
43 Exposition Cotton Mills, 76 N. I,. R. B. 183 (1948).
44 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 167 F.2d 662 (C. C. A. 51h 1948).
45 Andrew Jergens, 21 Lab. Re). Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1192 (NLRB 1948).
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had refused to bargain where the home office sent instructions to
a plant manager that its policy was to refuse maintenance of mem-
bership contracts. There was no refusal to bargain, said the
Board, because the company gave its reasons for refusing the pro-
visions, made counter-proposals and other concessions and reached
agreement on a substantial pay raisc and other matters.48
The Board likewise recently upheld the action of an employer
who raised the pay of unorganized workers alone while negotiat-
ing a contract with a union representing the organized group.
The employer, it found, committed no unfair labor practice in
iefusing to accede to the union's demand that its members receive
the same pay raise pending negotiation of a contract. "Absent
an unlawful motive," said the Board, "an employer is privileged
to give wage increases to his unorganized employees, at a time when
his other employees are seeking to bargain collectively .... ,,47 In
another case where the majority of the Board found the motive
for a wage increase was to prevent the reorganization of a union,
it was held to be interference. 48
Also, the Board has held pension plans and group health and
accident insurance programs to be proper subjects of collective
bargaining,0 a trial examiner has ruled that group insurance and
other social security programs are matters on which the employer
must bargain,;- and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has held that the granting of merit increases is a subject for
collective bargaining.
On September 23, 1948, the first court to pass directly upon the
question sustained the Board's position that pension and retire-
ment plans are subjects for collective bargaining.5
UNION SECUMTY
One of the principal features of the Taft-Hartley Act was the
amendment of Section 8 (a) (3) so as to prohibit discrimination
against employees to encourage or discourage membership in a
46 W. I. Cross & Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1131 (NLRB 1948).
4? Shell Oil Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1158 (NIRB 1948).
48 West Ohio Gas Co., 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1156 (NLRB 1948).
4D Inland Steel Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 1 (1948); W. IV. Cross & Co., 77 N. L. R.
B. 188 (1948).
,0 General Motors Corp, NLRB Release R-81.
521 NLRB v. J. H. Allison Co., 165 F.2d 766 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
62 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 17 U. S. L. Week 2133 (C. A. 7th, Sept. 28,
1948).
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union except under a contract containing a union shop provision
authorized by a vote of a majority of the employees in a unit. The
effect is to outlaw the closed shop and to require an election to
authorize a union shop or any lesser form of union security. The
administrative construction of this union security provision has
thus far come from the office of the General Counsel.
After the passage of the act, questions arose as to whether
"maintenance of membership" or "maintenance of dues" provi-
sions could be included in contracts and, if so, whether elections
were necessary. The General Counsel has ruled that union se-
curity provisions less than the union shop are valid if the union
obtains authorization to negotiate a union shop contract by a
majority vote in the required election. He has also held that a
union security provision may be included in the contract before
the necessary election has been held if the effectiveness of the pro-
vision is conditioned upon the union's first obtaining the requisite
vote. While there is some ambiguity on both of these matters,
these seem to be good practical answers. He has also ruled that
where a contract containing a union shop provision is executed
without the union having obtained the requisite authority in an
election, the mere execution of the contract is a violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) in the absence ot a condition that the provision shall
not be effective until the union shall have obtained the necessary
authority in an election; that the union shop election must be
conducted by the NLRB; and that a union failing to file non-
Communist affidavits or to comply with the other filing provisions
of the act may not enter into a valid union security provision since
it is not eligible to participate in such an election, 3
The statistics on the union shop elections during the first
year are interesting. Over 26,000 petitions for union shop author-
ization elections were filed with the Board. As of June 1, 1948,
]3,500 such elections had actually been conducted and authoriza-
tion won by unions in 13,300 or 98%. of the elections. Almost
a million and a quarter employees voted in these elections and
about 95% voted to authorize their union to enter into a union
shop contract. 4 It was this experience which prompted Senator
ta Address of NLRB As.oc. Gen. Counsel Brooks to the New Jersey Manu-
facturers' Assoc. D. L. R. 49, p. D-1.
,4 See address of Assoc. Gen. Co,:nscl Finding before Southern Industrial
Relations Conference NLRB Rel. R-107, p. 10.
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Ives to introduce a bill in the Senate designed at eliminating union
shop elections."
SEVERANCE OF CRAFT UNrrs
Section 9 (b)2 of the new act favors greater liberality in the
separation of true craft units, where a plant or company is organ-
ized on an industrial basis, through providing that the Board may
not "decide that any craft unit is inappropriate . . . on the
ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board
determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed
craft unit vote against separate representation." The new Board
recently asserted that it has been "easing the path of a union de-
siring severance of a craft union"ze1 and there is certainly an im-
posing number of decisions in which craft severances have been
grantedA7 However, due to the great variety of facts encountered
in craft severance cases, it is difficult to compare decisions by the
old and new board.
The Board has refused to accept the position that the new
act requires craft severance elections in all cases.: s Rather, the
Board has held that the new act preserves its discretion in deter-
mining units, except that it can not refuse a craft severance election
on the sole ground that a different unit was established by a prior
Board determination.
I JURISDICTION OVER LOCAL CONCERNS
The Taft-Hartley Act made no change in the coverage of the
Wagner Act - the coverage of both extending to businesses "af-
fecting" interstate commerce.50 Yet, under the Wagner Act, the
Board declined to assert its jurisdiction over many activities which
affected commerce, including particularly the construction indus-
try, cases where the effect on commerce was not substantial, and
5 N. Y. Times, May 6, 1948, p. 1.
56 In an important decision, National Tube Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 169 (1948),
the boa-d in refusing to grant a craft severance election pointed out very signif-
icantly, "Recent decisions should make it apparent that the Board has been in-
clined recently to exercise discretion in the direction of easing the path of a
union desiring severance of a craft unit . . .That is not the primary problem
before us here, nor is this decision to be taken to mean that that trend is about
to be reversed."
57 E.g., Hunter Packing Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1368 (1948).
68 American Rolling Mills Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 170 (1948); National Tube
Co., id. 169.
• 1 Pub. L. No. 101, §§ 9(c), 10(a), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 159(c), 160 (a)
(Supp. July 1947).
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borderline cases, usually on the ground that the assertion of juris-
diction would not effectuate the purposes of the act. Although
there is lack of agreement between the Board and its General
Counsel as to the extent to which the Board's jurisdiction should
be asserted, there is a clear tendency to extend the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The General Counsel takes the position that the
Board should take jurisdiction to the full extent of the authority
conferred by the act. It is of particular interest that in arguing
for his position, he stresses the protection which the act gives the
employer. In recent testimony before tie Congressional Joint
Committee on Labor-Management Relations, Mr. Denham stated
that a small businessman has "just as much right to protection"
as a large one.60 Consistent with this line of reasoning, he had pre-
viously advised the House Committee on Executive Expenditures
that very few firms were outside the coverage of the act. Thus, he
felt that hotels were covered because their customers were in inter-
state commerce and because they obtained goods from outside the
state. It was also his opinion that a laundry is covered if it serves
industrial establishments engaged in interstate commerce.01
The Board itself has shown reluctance about going to that
length. In his testimony before the Joint Committee on Labor-
Management Relations, Board Chairman Herzog, referring to Mr.
Denham's views in the matter, said:
"... . the Board members are not nearly so anxious to
move that far into new field, and .. .. we have discovered
no legal obligation to do so. The Board members' determina-
tion as to what will best effectuate the policies of the Act
must presumably prevail, unless and until Congress or the
Courts tell us that we are wrong."8 2
Despite this disagreement with the General Counsel, the
Board has continued to move into wider fields than did its prede-
cessor under the Wagner Act. For example, Mr. Herzog has
agreed that the Board may be obliged to move into the construc-
tion field because Congress clearly intended to regulate various
practices prevalent in that industry.13 Also, the Board ruled that
it would take jurisdiction over a retail automobile dealer, the bulk
60 N. Y. Times, June 12, 1948. p. 6.
81 Daily Labor Report 90, p. A-1 (1948).
62 NLRB Release R-92. p. 6.
03 ibid. In keeping with this position, a board trial examiner, disagreeing
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of whose sales were made locally but whose goods came directly
from outside the state;"' over a retail dry goods store whose only
connection with commerce was its receipt of 50% of its goods from
outside the state; 65 over local bus and trolley lines which purchased
substantial amounts of equipment from out of state sources, car-
ried passengers who were employed by businesses engaged in inter-
state commerce, and connected with interstate carriers at various
points.6 In other recent decisions on the question, however, the
Board has fallen back to the old Wagner Act standby "that it
would not effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdic-
tion" and refused to step into controversies involving a small
grocery chain in Texas,0 7 a local bus company, 8 a building mate-
rials manufacturer," a fertilizer manufacturer,o and a bakery
which obtained most of its raw materials from outside the state7 '
although the activities of each of the employers involved in those
cases "affected" commerce to some extent.
Very recently the Board decided that it would not assert juris-
diction over an employer operating a general office building oc-
cupied to a substantial extent by the office and clerical staffs of
firms engaged in interstate commerce such as railroad and tele-
graph companies.72 The operation of a general office building
is "essentially local in character" the Board concluded. 3
with a federal district court, held that a relatively small electrical contracting
firm which received $55,000 worth of goods annually from outside the state was
covered by the act. Gould and Preisner, NI RB Release R-106. But cf. Sperry
v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 77 F. Supp. 321 (D. Colo. 1948). SeeJ. H. Patterson Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1366 (NLRB 1943), where
the Board took jurisdiction over a building zupply distributing firm because of
the close relationship between that business and the construction industry.
64 Liddon-White, 76 N. L. R. B. 165. The dissenting members felt that
the decision meant a "general change in policy."
05 Parks-Belk Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 71 (1948).
06 Philadelphia Suburban Transit Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1390
(NLRB 1948); Safety Motor Transport Corp., id. 1257; Lynchburg Transit Co.,
id. 1419.
07 Hom-Ond Stores, 77 N. L. R. B. 101 (1948).
68 Duke Power Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 103 (1948).
69 Tampa Sand 9: Gravel Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1253 (NLRB
1948).
TO West Coast Fertilizer Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1255 (NLRB
1948).
71 Sta-Kleen Bakery Co., 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Ref. Man.) 1257 (NLRB 1948).
72 Midland Building Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 171 (1948).
73 The decision of the Board relies to a great extent upon the decision
in 10 East 40th Street Building Inc. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 (1945) where it
was held that employees employed in a similar building were not engaged in
interstate commerce or production of goods for interstate commerce under the
FLSA.
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In another significant decision T4 regarding coverage, the
Board said that its determination to assert jurisdiction in a partic-
ular case would depend upon the extent to which a firm's activ-
ities have affected commerce over a period of years and not alone
on the extent of the firm's commerce activities at the time of the
alleged commission of an unfair labor practice. Otherwise, the
Board reasoned, a firm might be covered by the act one week,
month or year, but not the next.
CONCI.USION
In the address from which I quoted at the outset, General
Counsel Denham said:
"The success or failure of this Act will depend upon how
it is utilized by those who come within its orbit, and upon how
those who are responsible for its administration apply it."
How management and labor use the act is indeed important. It
is to be hoped that they will both avoid taking extreme positions
and will give the act a reasonable and practical construction in
their day-to-day relations. However, the success of the act truly
depends upon the manner in which it is administered. To be ef-
fective it must have that balanced administration which the Wag-
ner Act did not receive. Thus far, to my mind, there is every indi-
cation that the Board is endeavoring so to administer it.
74 Barton Brass Works, 78 N. L. R. B. 56 (1948).
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